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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents several novel approaches to enhance security, and increase the
throughput, and decrease the delay synchronization in 5G networks.
First, a new physical layer paradigm was proposed for secure key exchange between the
legitimate communication parties in the presence of a passive eavesdropper was presented. The
proposed method ensures secrecy via pre-equalization and guarantees reliable communications
using Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes. One of the main findings of this research is to
demonstrate through simulations that the diversity order of the eavesdropper will be zero unless
the main and eavesdropping channels are almost correlated, while the probability of key mismatch
between the legitimate transmitter and receiver will be low. Simulation results demonstrate that
the proposed approach achieves very low secret key mismatch between the legitimate users, while
ensuring very high error probability at the eavesdropper.
Next, a novel medium access control (MAC) protocol Slotted Aloha-NOMA (SAN),
directed to Machine to Machine (M2M) communication applications in the 5G Internet of Things
(IoT) networks was proposed. SAN is matched to the low-complexity implementation and sporadic
traffic requirements of M2M applications. Substantial throughput gains are achieved by enhancing
Slotted Aloha with non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and a Successive Interference
Cancellation (SIC) receiver that can simultaneously detect multiple transmitted signals using
power domain multiplexing. The gateway SAN receiver adaptively learns the number of active
devices using a form of multi-hypothesis testing and a novel procedure enables the transmitters to

vi

independently select distinct power levels. Simulation results show that the throughput of SAN
exceeds that of conventional Slotted Aloha by 80% and that of CSMA/CA by 20% with a
probability of transmission of 0.03, with a slightly increased average delay owing to the novel
power level selection mechanism.
Finally, beam sweeping pattern prediction, based on the dynamic distribution of user
traffic, using a form of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) called Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) is
proposed. The spatial distribution of users is inferred from data in call detail records (CDRs) of
the cellular network. Results show that the users spatial distribution and their approximate location
(direction) can be accurately predicted based on CDRs data using GRU, which is then used to
calculate the sweeping pattern in the angular domain during cell search. Furthermore, the datadriven proposed beam sweeping pattern prediction was compared to random starting point
sweeping (RSP) to measure the synchronization delay distribution. Results demonstrate the datadrive beam sweeping pattern prediction enable the UE to initially assess the gNB in approximately
0.41 of a complete scanning cycle that is required by the RSP scheme with probability 0.9 in a
sparsely distributed UE scenario.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Generation (5G) mobile network is envisioned to support a wide range of use
cases, that fall under three main categories: enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive
Machine-type communication (mMTC), and ultra-reliable and low-latency communication
(URLLC). It worth noting that these usage scenarios may not necessarily fit all use cases, however,
they identify the capabilities needed for the 5G new radio (NR) interface. The high data rates and
capacity requirements of eMBB make frequency bands above 24 GHz a key enabler for 5G
networks. These bands are called the mmWave band since the wavelength is in the millimeter
range, which introduces new technical challenges due to the propagation characteristics of the
frequencies at that band [1]. One of the main challenges in mMTC, where a substantial number of
connected devices with sporadic traffic is the design of the medium access control (MAC) protocol
that is scalable, cost-effective, energy efficient and has low delay access (latency) [2]. The URLLC
use cases are envisioned to have extremely low latency (1 ms) and high reliability. The 5G
networks will support a wide range of data that needs to be protected against unauthorized access.
Cryptosystems have been used to ensure security; however due to the dynamic and heterogeneous
nature of 5G Networks the cryptographic key distribution and management are challenging.
Next, the research areas investigated in this dissertation will now be described in the
following sections.
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1.1 Secure Key Management in Symmetric Cryptography via Physical Layer Security
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes wireless transmissions vulnerable to
eavesdropping. To ensure that the information is conveyed securely, cryptographic encryption
techniques are often employed in the upper layers of the communication protocol stack. For
example, symmetric cryptography methods (e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard [AES]) use
a common private key that is pre-shared between the source and destination, referred to Alice and
Bob, will be assumed in this dissertation to encrypt/decrypt data. In contrast to the symmetric
cryptography, asymmetric cryptography methods such as Public Key Cryptosystems (PKC) use
public and private keys. In today’s mobile communication systems, symmetric cryptography has
been used due to its low computational cost and fast execution speed compared to PKC. However,
if the legitimate parties do not pre-share a common key, then key distribution is recognized as a
major problem. Key distribution includes establishing the session key and securely conveyed to
both parties (Alice and Bob) through a wireless channel, that is prone to be intercepted by an
eavesdropper, referred to as Eve and as illustrated in Figure 1.1. For next generation, wireless
networks, such as 5G wireless, the process of key management (key generation and secure key
exchange) will become even more critical as the number of nodes increases to a massive scale and
nodes become more heterogeneous in their computational capabilities. We envision that physical
layer security methods may be used as an additional layer of security to complement traditional
cryptographic methods.
Private Key

Alice

Wireless Channel

Bob

Eve

Figure 1.1 Sharing a key in symmetric key cryptography

2

Our research is directed towards a novel and secure key management technique that passes
the locally generated session key through a transmit filter that “inverts” the channel between Alice
and Bob [3].
1.2 Medium Access Protocol for M2M in IoT Networks
The rapid growth of both the number of connected devices and the data volume that is
expected to be associated with emerging Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications, has increased the
popularity of Machine-to-Machine (M2M) type communication within 5G wireless
communication systems [4]. The vast number of devices in M2M communications, their diverse
service requirements, and the unique traffic characteristics pose a real MAC layer design
challenge. For example, in a smart home use case, as depicted in Figure 1.2, the smart devices may
randomly and infrequently transmit a small burst of data to the smart home cloud server through
an IoT gateway. Uncoordinated random access schemes have attracted lots of attention in the
standards of the cellular network as a possible MAC protocol for making a massive number of
M2M communication possible with a low signaling overhead [5], [6].

MAC Layer

Smart Home
Cloud Server

Internet Access
IoT Gateway

Remote Home Controller
“SmartPhone”

Figure 1.2 Smart home with IoT
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Our research is directed towards inventing, analyzing, and implementing an uncoordinated
MAC protocol, that guarantees access to the IoT gateway with high throughput, yet is simple to
implement. In [7], we present an enhancement to the slotted Aloha-Non-Orthogonal Multiple
Access (NOMA) protocol, where the IoT gateway adaptively learns the number of active devices
(which is not known a priori) using a form of multi-hypothesis testing [8]. Furthermore, we
compare the Slotted Aloha-NOMA (SAN) with the state of the art CSMA/CA protocol, which is
widely adopted as a MAC protocol by many IoT technologies, in terms of throughput and average
delay channel access.
1.3 Deep Learning Based Initial Access in mmWave 5G Cellular Systems
Millimeter wave (mmWave) communications is an enabling technology for the 5G eMBB
use cases due to the available bandwidth at these frequencies. However, the initial access in
mmWave cellular systems is challenging compared to the current long-term evolution (LTE)
system for two reasons. First, due to the high isotropic path-loss, the mmWave communications
requires highly directional transmission. But the user equipment (UE) and 5G base station (gNB)
do not know in which directions to transmit (receive) during the initial access. Second, since the
mmWave link is vulnerable to blockage and beam misalignment, more frequent initial access
needs to be performed [9]- [12]. The reliance on directional transmission (beamforming), however,
makes the cell discovery (cell search) challenging since both gNB and UE jointly perform a search
over angular space to locate potential beams to initiate communication. In the cell discovery phase,
sequential beam sweeping is performed through the angular coverage region to transmit
synchronization signals as shown in Figure 1.3. The sweeping pattern can either be a linear rotation
or a hopping pattern that makes use of additional information.
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UE’s Beams

gNB’s Beams

Figure 1.3 Beam sweeping during initial access in mmWave 5G cellular systems
Our research is focused on the time required for initial access in mmWave 5G cellular
systems. In [13]-[14] we applied a deep learning Neural Network algorithm to accelerate the
synchronization process during the initial access phase by leveraging intelligence from call detail
records (CDR) data from Milan to rapidly determine the sweeping direction pattern during the cell
discovery phase using Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) to predict the user spatial distribution
from the evolution of the CDR.
1.4 Contributions and Organization of This Dissertation
The contributions presented in this dissertation are directed to exploring and evaluating
novel approaches for improving security, throughput, and latency in 5G systems and include the
following:
•

Secure key management for 5G: Propose and evaluate through simulation a novel physical
layer security approach for secure key management in symmetric cryptography that is
optimized for 5G networks that operate in the mmWave spectrum.

•

Medium Access Control for M2M in IoT Network: Create a novel MAC layer protocol,
SAN, that is a synergistic combination of the low complexity slotted Aloha protocol with
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the high throughput feature of NOMA by using the successive interference cancellation
(SIC) receiver.
•

Data-Driven Beam Sweeping for 5G mmWave Cellular systems: Propose a data-driven
Machine Learning approach for initial access in the mmWave cellular system to reduce the
synchronization delay compared to the random starting point beam sweeping.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review for the

different research areas in this dissertation. The physical layer approach for secure key
management in symmetric cryptography and the simulation results are given in Chapter 3. A novel
medium access protocol for M2M communication SAN is presented and evaluated in Chapter 4.
A data-driven beam sweeping approach for initial access in mmWave 5G NR is presented in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and provides future research direction.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides a literature review of the prior art in the three main topics of this
dissertation. First, different prior art physical layer security techniques are reviewed. Second, prior
MAC layer protocols for M2M (Machine-to-Machine) communications are described, with a focus
on Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance CSMA/CA, due to its widespread use.
Next, the prior art in the initial access for 5G mmWave cellular systems will be presented. Finally,
a brief review of the use of machine learning in wireless communications is presented.
2.1 Physical Layer Security Overview
Physical layer security has gained much attention lately since, under the right
circumstances, the technology is capable of providing wireless networks with basic security
requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The fundamental concept of
physical layer security is to exploit the randomness of the wireless channel to enable security.
Physical layer security offers enhanced wireless network security by exploiting wireless
channel characteristics to generate a secret key between the communication nodes. Using training
sequences (probing signals), both parties can measure the channel parameters such as the received
signal strength indicator (RSSI) [15]- [18], the channel state information (CSI) [19]- [20], or the
power spectral density (PSD) [21] of the probing signals to agree on a secret key using one or more
of these parameters. However, the randomness that can be extracted from the channel through the
signal processing techniques proposed in [15]- [21] is limited by the randomness in the channel.
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For stationary or low-mobility users, the channel randomness is very low, and the number
of uncorrelated bits that can be generated from the channel is very few. Furthermore, the
techniques proposed in [15]- [21] are prone to manipulation. An adversary may physically
introduce blockage or digitally transmit/not transmit jamming signals to manipulate the
distribution of bits. In [22]- [25], precoding matrix indicator (PMI) based key generation methods
were proposed, which employ predefined codebooks to generate unique keys for devices with
multiple antennas. To increase the key generation rate, a channel independent approach was
proposed in [26] for fast secret key extraction. In [26], the receiver with a full-duplex transmission
capability jams one of the two copies of the secret key sent by the transmitter. An Artificial Noise
Injection (ANI) based physical layer approach was proposed in [27] to secure space-time block
codes. ANI symbols are added to the information symbols such that they are aligned at the intended
receiver and can be subtracted from the information symbols, while they degrade the unintended
receiver performance. However, despite its good performance, this approach requires the
legitimate transmitter to know the instantaneous channel of the eavesdropper, which may not be
possible in many practical applications. Another drawback of [26]- [27] is that jamming and ANIbased techniques increase the interference in the system and they are not energy efficient.
2.2 MAC Layer for M2M Communications
The MAC protocols for wireless networks have been intensively investigated in the
existing literature and can be classified into three main categories as contention-based, contentionfree, and hybrid protocols that incorporate the advantages of contention-based and contention-free
protocols. Table 2.1 presents several MAC protocols and their associated technology. ZigBee is
among those technologies and one of the most commonly used standards in IoT. The MAC
protocol in ZigBee is IEEE 802.15.4 and uses CSMA/CA, which is a multiple access mechanism
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Table 2.1 Overview of MAC protocols for IoT
Technology
Channel access

Contention-based

Slotted Aloha

√

Non-slotted CSMA/CA

√

Slotted CSMA/CA

√
√

Time Division Multiple Access

√

√

√

√

Frequency Division Multiple Access
Scheduledbased

√

LorRaWAN

Pure Aloha

Sigfox

NB-IoT

LTE-M

WiFi

RFID2

BLE1

ZigBee

mechanisms

√

√

Code Division Multiple Access

√

used to reduce collisions in wireless networks3. Long Term Evolution for Machines (LTE-M) is
designed to meet M2M and IoT requirements. It is an LTE radio network protocol to enable simple
and low-cost devices. Long battery life is enabled by optimizing the efficiency of the transmission
and higher layer protocols. Enhanced coverage is designed to reach deep indoor and rural areas.

1

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) uses a contention-free MAC with low latency.
Radio frequency identification system (RFID)
3
Carrier-sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) is a network multiple access method in which
carrier sensing is used, where nodes attempt to avoid collisions by transmitting only when the channel is sensed to be
"idle". When they do transmit, nodes transmit their packet data in its entirety. Sensing is particularly important for
wireless networks, where the collision detection (CD) of the alternative CSMA/CD, used in wired Ethernet, is
unreliable due to the hidden node problem.
2
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The narrowband internet of things (NB-IoT) is a technology based on the LTE that can be deployed
in three different modes (1) stand alone and occupying 200 kHz, (2) in-band within the wideband
of LTE and occuping only one physical resource block of LTE (180 kHz), and (3) within the guard
band of LTE and occuping one physical resource block [28]. Sigfox and LoRaWAN both operate
in the unlicenced band. In both technologies, the IoT devices access the base station by sending
their packets using pure Aloha, where each active IoT device transmits at a random time in a
randomly selected channel [29]. For IoT use cases, including M2M, MAC protocols need to be
reconsidered to meet several requirements such as data throughput, scalability, energy efficiency,
coexistence, and cost-effectiveness [30].
2.2.1

Contention-Based MAC Protocols
As the name implies, the nodes in the M2M scenario contend to access the shared medium.

Although the contention-based MAC protocols match the M2M requirements in terms of satisfying
the cost-efficient implementation requirements, they are unsuited to the dense M2M deployment
due to frequent collisions, which results in low throughput. Pure-Aloha, Slotted Aloha, and
CSMA/CA are examples of such contention-based MAC protocols [31].
This dissertation focusses on improving on the performance of CSMA/CA based protocols
such as IEEE 802.11 (WiFi), which are among the most widely deployed MAC protocols that use
CSMA/CA. However, as the network size increases in the M2M application, CSMA/CA does not
scale accordingly due to the increased probability of collisions. Another shortcoming is the energy
wasted by CSMA/CA based protocols due to collisions and idle listening.
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard specifies the MAC and physical (PHY) layers for low-rate
wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs). The CSMA/CA mechanism is used to reduce
collision probability due to simultaneous node transmissions. In the standard, two-channel access
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modes are defined — a beacon-enabled, where periodic beacons are used in the personal area
network (PAN) for synchronization. In this case, the MAC sublayer employs the slotted version
of the CSMA/CA algorithm and exponential backoff for re-transmissions in the contention access
period (CAP) of the superframe [32], while in the unslotted version the CSMA/CA algorithm is
used in non-beacon-enabled mode.
In the slotted CSMA/CA algorithm of IEEE 802.15.4, each device’s MAC sub-layer
initiates three variables for each transmission attempt. The number of times (NB) the CSMA-CA
algorithm was required to back off while attempting the current transmission, the contention
window (CW) length, which defining the number of backoff periods that need to be clear of
channel activity before the transmission can start and the bakeoff exponent (BE), which is related
to the number of bakeoff periods an IoT device waits before attempting to assess the channel.
Figure 2.1 depicts the flowchart of the IEEE 802.15.4 slotted CSMA/CA scheme.
Consider an IoT device trying to transmit a packet. In IEEE 802.15.4 with slotted
CSMA/CA, the number of backoffs and the contention window are initialized (NB = 0 and CW =
2). Depending on the value of the Battery Life Extension MAC attribute, the backoff exponent is
initialized to BE = 2 or BE = min (2, macMinBE), where macMinBE is a constant defined in the
standard [31]. Next, the algorithm starts counting down a random number of backoff periods (BPs)
uniformly generated within [0, 2BE-1] at the boundary of a BP. When the timer expires, the
algorithm then performs one clear channel assessment (CCA) operation at the BP boundary to
assess channel activity. If the channel is busy, CW is reset to 2, NB and BE are incremented, where
BE must not exceed aMaxBE (default value equal to 5) [32]. Observe that incrementing BE
increases the probability of greater backoff delays. Once the maximum number of backoffs (NB =
macMaxCSMABackoffs = 5) is reached, a failure is reported to the higher layer. Otherwise, the
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IoT device performs another backoff operation. If the channel is sensed as idle, CW is
decremented. The CCA is repeated if CW ് 0 to avoid collisions with acknowledgment frames. If
the channel is again sensed as idle, the IoT device attempts to transmit, if the remaining BPs in the
current CAP is sufficient to transmit the frame and the subsequent acknowledgment. If not, the
CCAs and the frame transmission are both postponed to the next superframe.
Slotted CSMA/CA

NB = 0, CW = 2

Batterylife
Extension?

Yes

BE = min (2, macMinBE)

No
BE = macMinBE

Locate Backoff
period Boundary

Delay for random ( 2B E -1) until
backoff period

Perform CCA on backoff period
boundary

Channel Idle?

Yes

No
CW = 2, NB = NB+1
BE = min(BE+1,aMaxBE)

No

CW = CW -1

No

NB>
macMaxCSMABackoffs?

CW = 0?

Yes

Yes

Transmit

Abort

Figure 2.1 IEEE 802.15.4 slotted CSMA/CA protocol flowchart [31].
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2.2.2

Contention-Free MAC Protocols
Contention-free protocols (scheduled-based) pre-assign the resources to the devices in the

network. Based on the assigned resources, there are three common scheduled based protocols.
First, time division multiple access (TDMA), where the bandwidth is a located to the device for a
fraction of the time. Second, frequency division multiple access (FDMA), where the devices are
assigned a portion of the spectrum all the time. Third, code division multiple access (CDMA),
where orthogonal codes are assigned to the devices in the network. In the context of M2M
communications, the static channel allocation results in poor utilization at low loads (where the
number of active devices is small) [31]. Dynamic contention-free protocols that assign the
resources adaptively based on the active devices in the network are better suited for M2M in terms
of resource utilization; however, the dynamic allocation of the resources demands extra overhead.
2.2.3

Hybrid MAC Protocols
Hybrid MAC protocols are designed to combine the advantages of the contention-free and

the scheduled-based MAC protocols. In [33] CSMA is used during the contention period (CP) and
TDMA during the transmission period (TP). The successful devices during the contention period
are guaranteed time slots during the transmission period. In [34] the performance of framed hybrid
MAC protocol was formulated as an optimization problem to determine the trade-off between CP
and TP lengths that increase the total system throughput in M2M. The high rate of collisions
during the reservation stage is the bottleneck that prevents hybrid protocols from achieving high
utilization in dense M2M networks. The slotted Aloha-NOMA protocol [7] exploits the simplicity
of slotted Aloha (used during the CP) and the superior throughput of non-orthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) (used during TP) [35] and its unique ability to resolve collisions via the use of a
successive interference cancellation (SIC) receiver [36], [37]. The recently introduced Aloha-
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NOMA protocol [38] and subsequent enhancements [39] are a promising candidate MAC protocol
that can be utilized for low complexity IoT devices. In [39] NOMA is applied to multichannel
slotted Aloha to enhance the throughput with respect to conventional multichannel slotted Aloha
[40] without the need for any bandwidth expansion [39]. The slotted Aloha-NOMA protocol is a
promising method for not requiring any scheduling, apart from frame synchronization, in which
all IoT devices transmit to the gateway at the same time on the same frequency band. In Chapter
4, we present an enhancement to the slotted Aloha-NOMA protocol where the receiver adaptively
learns the number of active devices (which is not known a priori) using a form of multi-hypothesis
testing and comparison of Slotted Aloha-NOMA with CSMA/CA in terms of throughput and
average delay [7].
2.3 Initial Access in mmWave 5G Cellular Systems
The initial access procedure in 5G mmWave network has been investigated by the IEEE
and 3GPP standards groups and the IEEE 802.11ad standard adopted two levels of initial
beamforming training for 60 GHz operation, where a coarser sector sweep phase is followed by
an optional beam refinement phase [41]. The sector sweep phase consists of four components: the
initiator (the station (STA) that initiates the beam training) sector sweep, the receive sector sweep
(the recipient STA), feedback and acknowledgment [42]. The beam adaptation is illustrated in
Figure 2.2 and can be summarized as having the following phases: (1) The initiator transmits
training signals on all sectors sequentially, while the responder is receiving the training signal
using a quasi-omni radiation pattern, (2) the same procedure is done during the receive sector
sweep and (3) both the initiator and the receiver inform each other of the best sector they have
heard during the training by exchangings feedback messages. Next, the beams from the sector level
training may be further refined in the beamforming refinement phase. The IEEE 802.11ad standard
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supports beam tracking by sending the measurement results of the acquired beams in the
subsequent packets [43]-[44]. In [45] a technical specification for mmWave cellular systems is
introduced, where the gNB employs beam sweeping during the cell search, and the beam reference
signal (BRS) is transmitted to facilitate the UE to determine the gNB beamforming directions. The
standardization of initial access in mmWave cellular is still in the early stages, however, several
research efforts have been directed toward this problem [46]- [50]. An exhaustive approach to
sequentially searching all transmit-receive beam pairs has been introduced in [46]. The hierarchical
search, which is used in IEEE 802.11ad is introduced in [47], where gNB first applies exhaustive
search over wide beams, then in a second phase refines the search to narrow beams. A comparative
analysis between brute force search and hierarchal schemes is presented in [48], which concludes
that the hierarchal approach has smaller initial delay access compared to the exhaustive search, but
the exhaustive search provides better coverage to cell-edge users. It is reported in [49] that the
initial access delay can be reduced by transmitting the synchronization signals omni-directionally.
The initial access efficiency is enhanced by leveraging synchronization from a macro base station
eNB (operating at sub 6 GHz), followed by a sequential spatial search from the mmWave gNB[50][51]. In [52] the authors consider the availability of context information (CI) (the location
information of the mmWave gNB ) at the UE, so that the UE, rather than searching the whole
angular space, will form its combining beam only in the direction provided by the CI. Recently
context information (e.g., vehicle’s position) and past beam measurements stored in a database
(maintained in the roadside unit in vehicular communications) has been used as a hint to determine
potential beam pairs. The idea of the proposed approach is to learn a scoring function that can be
used to predict the scores of beam pairs and provide a means to rank them [53]. Generally
speaking, the initial access procedure can be improved by using “richer” information, e.g., terminal
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positions, channel gain predictions, user spatial distribution, antenna configurations successfully
used in previous accesses, and so on.

Figure 2.2 IEEE 802.11ad beam training protocol
2.4 Machine Learning in Wireless Communications
Machine learning (ML) has grown rapidly due to several reasons including tremendous
improvements in ML algorithms and computational power, as well as access to a large amount of
data. Researchers in many disciplines such as computer vision, voice recognition, natural language
processing, medical imagery, and finance have contributed to many of the state-of-the-art ML
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algorithms. Building upon the success of ML in the previous areas, the data analytic approach
started to gain momentum in different research areas in wireless communications. Since many
problems in wireless communications can be converted to clustering, classification, or regression
problems, ML algorithms can be trained to solve them. Deep Learning is a sub-division of ML,
which learns from raw data through multiple layers of nonlinear units, to realize a Deep Neural
Network that can predict or act based on the target objective.
Deep Learning has been broadly investigated in the mobile network context. In [54] Deep
Learning is used to estimate user’s Quality of Experience (QoE) in a cellular network with high
accuracy. A Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neural network applied to estimate the QoE based on
key performance indicators (KPI), such as the average user throughput, the number of active users
in the cell, and the channel quality indicators (CQI). Deep reinforcement learning has also been
applied to cloud radio access networks (C-RANs) to determine the on/off modes of remote radio
heads given, the current mode and user demand for power-efficient resources allocation [55]. Deep
Learning is leveraged as a tool for mobility analysis due to its ability to capture spatial
dependencies in sequential data. A trajectory prediction using Deep Learning is studied in [56]. A
proactive resource allocation using a recurrent neural network (RNN) was proposed in [57] to
predict the next base station from the received signal strength (RSS) values, which provide higher
channel capacities for multiple users and alleviate the problem of frequent handovers for high
mobility users. In [58] a convolutional neural network (CNN) was used as a modulation classifier.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, an overview of selected physical layer security techniques was presented.
Then potential MAC protocols for M2M application and design challenges were presented. Next,
the initial access issues in 5G mmWave a different wireless technology than heretofore used, was
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described. Finally, an overview of applying ML across diverse wireless communications
applications was presented.
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CHAPTER 3: SECURE KEY MANAGEMENT IN SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter4, we present a new physical layer paradigm for secure key exchange in
symmetric cryptography between the legitimate communication parties in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper. The proposed method ensures secrecy via pre-equalization and guarantees reliable
communications by the use of Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes. LDPC codes are class of
linear block codes that were first introduced by Gallager in his doctoral dissertation in 1963[59].
LDPC codes were chosen for the proposed scheme due to its powerful capability of correcting
errors. In addition to its high coding gain, the LDPC codes are computationally more efficient than
other popular Turbo codes because they require fewer operations to achieve the same target block
error rate [60]. The latest release (Release 15) of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
has adopted LDPC for data channels (user plane) and Polar code for the control channels (control
plane) due to its better performance at a moderate payload, typical of control information [61].
3.2 System Model and Proposed Method
Consider a generic wireless network system model as depicted in Figure 3.1, where Alice
and Bob are the legitimate communication nodes and Eve is the passive eavesdropper. Alice wants
to share a secret sequence (private key) with Bob in the presence of Eve by pre-filtering the secret
sequence using a filter that inverts the main channel, i.e., the channel between Alice and Bob ℎ"# .
The received signals at Bob and Eve can be respectively expressed

The content of this chapter has been published in [3] and it is included in this dissertation with permission from the
IEEE. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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$# (&) = ∑- ℎ"# (*)+(& − *) + 0# (&)

(3.3)

$1 (&) = ∑- ℎ"1 (*)+(& − *) + 01 (&) ,

(3.4)

where * = 0, 1, ⋯ and & is the discrete time index and ℎ"# , ℎAE are the main and the wiretap
channels as depicted in Figure 3.1. It is assumed that channels remain fixed during the transmission
of a few symbols but may randomly change over time, the symbol + is the coded secret sequence
(private key), and 0# (&), 01 (&) represent the i.i.d. additive Gaussian noise at Bob and Eve,
respectively. The objective is to securely share a private key between Alice and Bob. Before the
transmission, a secret key x with a length of N bits is generated by the transmitter (Alice) to ensure
a low probability of interception at Eve. The proposed signaling procedure is shown in Figure 3.2
and the steps are as follows:
Training

hAB
Key exchange
Alice

hA

E

Bob

Eve

Figure 3.1 System model
1. Bob transmits a training sequence to Alice (and known to Alice) for channel estimation.
2. Alice estimates the channel and determines the transmit filter that inverts the channel.
Using this filter, there is now a “perfect” (distortionless) channel between Alice and Bob
(of course there is still background noise in the channel)..
3. Alice sends the secret key to Bob after passing it through a LDPC encoder with a rate 6 =
1⁄2 and a transmitter filter.
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4. Bob receives the pre-equalized signal (containing the session key). The signal is then
passed through an LDPC decoder.
5. Thus, the secure key sequence is conveyed from Alice to Bob with high reliability due to
the powerful error correcting capability of LDPC codes.
6. Bob sends an ACK/NACK to Alice based on the error detection capability of the LDPC
code . If the detected errors cannot be corrected, a NACK is sent to Alice and Steps 1-5 are
repeated. Otherwise, an ACK signal is sent indicating that the session key was successfully
received and the key exchange procedure is complete.
7. Key exchange for secure transmission has now been established between Alice and Bob.
To convey the data in a secure way, the generated secret key is input to a random number
generator (RNG) as a seed by Alice and Bob. The data bit sequence is XORed with the
outputs of the RNGs to confuse Eve further, even if she perfectly estimates the received
signal.
Alice

Bob
Training

Key Exch

ange

ACK

ACK/N

Start Secure C
om

munication

Figure 3.2 Signaling procedure
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Eve

The proposed transmitter and receiver structures for key exchange are depicted in Figure
3.3. The encoded secret key bits 9 (LDPC encoder output) are mapped to : QPSK symbols. Next,
the modulated symbols : are passed through the transmit filter ; to form
+(&) = ∑- ;(& − *):(*),

(3.5)

Alice
Secret bits

LDPC
Encoder

u
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Figure 3.3 Proposed key management exchange
where +(&) is the transmitted signal in (3.1) and (3.2). The transmit filter ; that inverts the main
channel is designed to achieve high secrecy even if Eve knows her channel ℎAE and even if the
wiretap channel is less noisy than the main channel, i.e., Eve has a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
compared to Bob. Since Alice estimates the main channel ℎAB using the training sequence sent by
Bob, through a reciprocal main channel where ℎAB = ℎBA , the transmit filter ; can be determined
as
ℎ#" ; = ‖ℎ#" ‖.

(3.6)

The normalized coefficients of the transmit filter ; are determined by inverting ℎ#" in
(3.4) directly, or by using Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse [62] if the channel ℎ#" contains nulls.
Therefore, the received signal at Bob can be rewritten as
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$# (&) = ‖ℎ#" ‖:(&) + 0# (&)

(3.7)

Bob can detect := by estimating the received signal power
‖ℎ#" ‖> = ∑@ABC|$# (&)|> .

(3.8)

The security of the proposed scheme lies in the fact that Eve is unable to correctly decode
the pre-filtered secret key in (3.3) due to the uncorrelated main and wiretap channels as we will
discuss in next section.
3.3 Correlation Model
3.3.1

Phenomenological Model
The transmit filter ; depends on the main channel which is expected to be uncorrelated

with the eavesdropping channel for link distances larger than a half wavelength due to the spatial
property of wireless transmission. However, in practice, there exists some correlation between the
two channels as reported in [63]. To capture the correlation effects, without loss of generality, we
consider the following correlation model [64]
ℎ"1 = Eℎ"# + F1 − E> ℎAAG ,

(3.9)

where E is the correlation coefficient and 0 ≤ E < 1 is the correlation coefficient between the
normalized channel impulse responses ℎ"1 and ℎ"# . The term ℎAAG represents an i.i.d. Rayleigh
fading channel that, ideally, has a zero correlation with ℎ"# . If E = 0, the main and wiretap
channels are uncorrelated, whereas non-zero values of E indicate a higher correlation which
increases the probability of successful eavesdropping. When Eve is located very close to Bob
(within a few wavelengths), a higher correlation between the main and wiretap channels may
occur, which would help Eve detect the transmitted symbols by using processing similar to Bob
using (3.5) and (3.6). This would result in a higher probability of key intercept by Eve, which will
be presented in terms of frame error probability in the results section. The previous correlation
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model is a phenomenological correlation model and does not capture either the effect of spatial
parameters or the operating frequency of the system.
3.3.2

Spatial Correlation
To illustrate the spatial correlation between the Rayleigh fading channel impulse response

realizations at Bob and Eve we used the deterministic channel model for spatially correlated
Rayleigh fading [65], the channel responses are given by
C

ℎ"# =

√K

ℎ"1 =

√K

C

∑KRBC cosO2PQR S + T (U) R V + WXY+(2PQR S + T (Z) R ),

(3.10)

∑KRBC cosO2PQR S + [ (U) R V + WXY+(2PQR S + [ (Z) R ),

(3.11)

where T (U) R − [ (Z) R = P⁄2 to suppress the cross correlation between in-phase (I) and Quadratic
(Q) components of the channel realizations and QR = QG +\0 (&P/2^) models the temporal
correlation (QG is Doppler shift). The cross-correlation between the channel realizations (fading
waveforms) is given by
E = _ {ℎ"# ℎ"1 ∗ } =

C
K

∑KRBC exp (−W∆gR ),

(3.12)

where ∆gR = T (U) R − [ (U) R . The spatial correlation is given by
q

h( i⁄j) = ∫rq lmn(−W2Pi +\0o⁄j) Qp (o) io,

(3.13)

where d is the separation distance between Bob and Eve, λ is the wavelength of the operating
frequency and Qp (o) is the function of the incident angle, o ∈ (−P, P) is normalized
q

∫rq Qp (o)io = 1. The integral in (3.13) can be approximated as
C

h( i⁄j) ≅ K ∑KRBC lmn (−W2Pi +\0oR ⁄j),

(3.14)

by assuming equality between the (3.10) and (3.12), we have
2Pi sinoR ⁄λ = ∆gR ,

(3.15)

and from (3.15) ∆gR is calculated using the incident angle oR that is determined from the Gaussian
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or Laplacian distribution of Qp (o). Once ∆gR is obtained, it is used to find T (U) R and [ (U) R under
the condition that was previously defined T (U) R − [ (Z) R = P ⁄2. Using the previous information,
L spatially correlated channel realizations can be generated using (3.10) and (3.11), which are used
to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme for secure key management.
3.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results of the proposed method. We have
simulated the secure key management algorithm in MATLAB and obtained the performance
results in terms of Frame Error Probability (FEP) of the decoded signals (when the secret key is
transmitted) to Bob and also received by Eve during the secure key exchange phase. In the
simulations, we used a 512-bit key length and assumed Rayleigh block fading channels at the main
and wiretap channels using the correlation model in (3.7). All nodes are equipped with one antenna.
To simulate the main and wiretap channels using the deterministic models in (3.8) and
(3.9), the distribution of the incident angle Qp (o) is a Gaussian with mean x = 10P⁄180z and
standard deviation { = 3P⁄180z . The { is used as the measure of the incident angle spread. The
number of sinusoids is L = 32 to generate channel responses at two different locations (Eve and
Bob locations) separated by distance d for three different frequencies 2.14 GHz (LTE Band 1
Downlink central frequency), 28 GHz and 60 GHz. The correlation coefficient E ≈ 0.99 when d
= 0.01 m in the LTE band case, E ≈ 0.99 when d = 0.001 m when 28 GHz used as a carrier
frequency and, E ≈ 0.99 when d < 0.001 m in case of 60 GHz as shown in Figure 3.4. Observe
that at higher frequency the proposed scheme provides secure key exchange between Alice and
Bob because the main and wiretap channels are almost correlated when the separation distance
between Bob and Eve is very small, which shrinks the radius (R) of the vulnerable (insecure) zone
(i.e. the area where Eve has low FEP) as illustrated in Figure 3.5 and summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 The radius of the insecure zone for different frequencies.
Frequency

Radius (m)

2.14 GHz

0.01 m

28 GHz

0.001 m

60 GHz

< 0.001 m

Figure 3.4 The correlation of the generated Rayleigh fading channels responses as a function of
the separation distance between Eve and Bob at different frequencies.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the FEP for Bob and Eve for different channel correlations. The SNR
of Bob and Eve are assumed to be the same and varied between 0 dB and 5 dB in 0.5 dB increments.
We observe that due to the channel capacity achieving LDPC code, the probability of a key
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mismatch between Alice and Bob essentially goes to zero when the SNR > 2.5 dB, whereas the
FEP at Eve is very high for all SNR values for E < 0.9. This demonstrates that the proposed
algorithm achieves a diversity order of zero for Eve when E < 0.9. In other words, the number of
independent fading links between Alice and Eve is zero. When E < 0.9 the FEP of Eve is unity,
and the diversity order, which is defined as lim

Üáà (âäã(åçé))
Üáà ÅÇÉ

ÅÇÉ→ Ö

[66], is zero. The diversity order,

which can be interpreted as the number of independent communication links between Alice and
Eve, is zero. However, when the main and eavesdropping channels are almost correlated, i.e., E =
0.99, then the probability of key intercept increases at Eve and the system security decreases. In
fact, this is not a surprising result since the present physical layer security method relies on the
uniqueness between the main and wiretap channels, which can be observed from Eve’s FEP for
different correlation values in Figure 3.7. As the difference between the two channels disappears,
so does the security. Note that for E = 0.99, the channels are not essentially the same and it is for
this reason, there exists a slight difference in the FEP curves of Bob and Eve in Figure 3.6.

⇢ ⇡ 0.99

insecure zone
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Figure 3.5 The insecure zone radius.
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Next, we fix the SNR of the wiretap channel at 10 dB and vary the SNR of Bob from 0 dB
to 5 dB. This simulation scenario considers the case where Eve is closer to Alice than Bob. Even
though the previous scenario cannot physically exist when the channels are almost correlated, yet
it is an interesting point to simulate. The key-mismatch FEP results for Bob and Eve are shown in
Figure 3.8 for different correlation coefficients E between the wiretap channel and the main
channel. Although Eve has a better SNR than Bob, her FEP remains high for all E < 0.9 values.
For clarity in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, we have only presented results for a correlation of E = 0.9, but
the results are true for all E < 0.9. Note that when the channels are almost correlated, with E =
0.99, Bob makes errors until the SNR exceeds 2.5 dB, whereas Eve does not make an error since
her SNR is fixed at 10 dB. This is again due to the same reason as above where the security that
can be achieved with physical layer methods degrades as the main and wiretap channels become
highly correlated.

Figure 3.6 Bob FEP results and Eve ‘s FEP results for key exchange mismatch for different
correlation values E between the main and wiretap channel.
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Figure 3.7 Eve FEP results for different correlation values.

Figure 3.8 Key exchange mismatch FEP at Bob and Eve for different E between the main and the
wiretap channel and the SNR of Eve is fixed to 10 dB.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, a novel method is proposed to exchange a secret key between two legitimate
users using a novel physical layer security method. The uniqueness of the wireless channel
between the legitimate users and an eavesdropper is exploited to create a low probability of
interception and magnify the FEP at the unintended receiver (the eavesdropper), while the intended
receiver successfully receives the transmitted signal with a very low FEP. The proposed method
utilizes a pre-equalization filter and LDPC encoding at the transmitter. The simulation results
demonstrate that secure communication can be established unless the main and eavesdropping
channels are almost correlated. Furthermore, the proposed technique becomes more attractive at
mmWave frequencies because the correlation between the main channel and the wiretap channel
is small, which implies a low probability of key interception by Eve.
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CHAPTER 4: MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL FOR M2M COMMUNICATIONS IN IoT
NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT), which is the network of physical devices embedded with
sensors, actuators, and connectivity, is being accelerated into the mainstream by the emergence of
5G wireless networking that will support of Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications. Due
to the simplicity of IoT devices and their generally sporadic traffic in such application, a simple
medium access control (MAC) protocol is needed to connect M2M devices to the Internet through
a hub (IoT gateway).
In this chapter5, the novel Slotted Aloha-non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (SAN) protocol
for M2M communications is presented and compared with the well-known Slotted Aloha and
carrier sensing multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. The comparison is
based on two metrics, the throughput and the average delay. Simulation results show that the
throughput of SAN is higher than CSMA/CA at low probability of transmission at the cost of
increased average delay caused by a novel power level selection mechanism.
4.2 Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA)
NOMA has emerged as a promising technology in 5G networks for many applications [67].
The concept of NOMA relies on the ability of the receiver to separate the non-orthogonal signals.

The content of this chapter has been published in [7] and it is included in this dissertation with permission from the
IEEE. Permission is included in Appendix A
5
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In contrast to orthogonal multiple access schemes relying on time, frequency, code or their
combination, in power domain NOMA multiple devices share the same time-frequency and their
signals can be separated at the receiver in the power domain. In the SAN protocol, power domain
NOMA is used to allow multiple devices in the uplink to access the Internet through the IoT
gateway. The received signal at IoT gateway in Figure 4.1, where K =2, is given by
! = ∑)
&*+ ℎ& '(& ,& + .,

(4.1)

where ℎ& , (& , ,& and . are respectively the channel gain between the ith device and the IoT gateway,
the power scaling coefficient, transmitted signal of the ith device and the additive Gaussian noise.
Successive interference cancellation (SIC) is used at the receiver (IoT gateway), where the
strongest signal (e.g., Device 1 s1) is decoded first and the other signal (Device 2 s2 ) is considered
as a noise. Then, the detected signal (Device 1 s1) is subtracted from the from the superimposed
signal to detect s2[68].
Power
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p
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Figure 4.1 Power domain NOMA with two devices and with a SIC receiver.
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4.3 SAN Protocol
4.3.1

Overview
The SAN protocol is a synergistic combination of the low complexity Slotted Aloha

protocol with the high throughput feature of NOMA. In the SAN protocol, both the power and
time slots form multiple sub-channels as shown in Figure 4.2. During time slot 1, three devices
transmit with each device using distinct power levels, so there is no collision since the SIC receiver
can separate the signals in power domain. However, during time slot 3 the SIC receiver failed to
separate the signals (collision) from three devices because two devices transmitted at the same
power level. The main bottleneck of Slotted Aloha systems is the low throughput caused by the
high number of collisions, which can be addressed by NOMA. In SAN the signaling overhead is
reduced in the detection phase of the proposed protocol where the number of active IoT devices
are detected by the gateway using a form of multiple hypotheses testing, which is further explained
below. SAN is also an energy efficient protocol due to the fact that under most circumstances a
SIC receiver can resolve collisions, and thus minimize retransmissions. The SAN protocol can be
suitable for various scenarios where many IoT devices are transmitting simultaneously on the same
frequency with different power levels to an IoT gateway and the received signals can be separated
via the use of a SIC receiver. A sample illustration of this scenario is depicted in Figure 4.3 as a
smart home with an IoT network. Here, IoT devices send their data to the IoT gateway at the
beginning of the slot using the SAN protocol and if the received power levels have been properly
chosen, then the IoT gateway distinguishes the signals with a SIC receiver. The SAN scheme
increases the throughput significantly beyond that of conventional Slotted Aloha due to the use of
multiple power levels, which are additional channels in the power domain.
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Power Levels
Time

Slot #1
Collision

Figure 4.2 The synergic combination of Slotted Aloha and NOMA in SAN protocol. The figure
shows optimum performance in slot #1 (the devices choose distinct power levels and hence no
collision) and a collision in slot #3 where 2 device have chosen the same power level.

SAN

Smart Home
Cloud Server

Internet Access
IoT Gateway

Remote Home Controller
“SmartPhone”

Figure 4.3 A use case of SAN in the smart home with IoT.
The SAN protocol flowchart is depicted in Figure 4.4. First, the IoT gateway transmits a beacon
signal to announce its readiness to receive packets. Next, the IoT devices with packets ready to
transmit send a training sequence to aid the gateway in detecting the number of active IoT devices
in the medium. The IoT gateway detects the number of devices requesting transmission via a form
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of multiple hypotheses testing, as further explained next, and adjusts the degree6 of the SIC
receiver for the optimum power levels. In practice, the SIC receiver has a fixed range of optimum
power levels (e.g., m = 2, 3) corresponding to the number of devices that have been detected that
wish to transmit. If the IoT devices are registered with the gateway instead of using multihypothesis testing, implementation would be more straightforward; however, this will significantly
increase the length of the control phase and thus decrease the payload or throughput considering
the potentially large number of IoT devices. Third, if the detected number of active IoT devices is
not in the range of the SIC capability (that is, the number of devices wanting to transmit exceeds
the SIC degree), the IoT gateway aborts the transmission and starts the frame again by sending a
new beacon signal and the active transmitters use a random backoff. If the detected number of
devices is within the SIC degree, the IoT gateway broadcast the SIC degree to the transmitters
and then each active IoT device randomly picks one of the optimum power levels. If the choices
of power levels are distinct, the SIC receiver can decode the self-identifying signals (device ID +
payload) and then the gateway sends an ACK. However, if the active IoT devices did not select
distinct power levels, the reselection process is repeated and after a few attempts, say k, if there is
no successful transmission, the users receive a NACK and enter a random back-off mode. This
will improve fairness among the users and will allow for the possibility of fewer active users in
the next session (which will improve the probability of successful transmission). It should be clear,
that the proposed protocol will be most efficient when there are a small number of active devices,
so that the probability of “randomly” choosing distinct optimum power levels, after one or two
random tries, is high.

6

We denote a SIC receiver that can process m signals as SIC(/) and we refer to m as the SIC degree.

35

IoT-Gateway
broadcasts beacon

N active IoT devices request
transmission

N: detected number of active IoT devices
k: maximum number of allowed attempts
m: optimum number of SIC power levels

Detect the number of active devices
(Multi-hypothesis testing )

Yes
N>m
No
IoT-Gateway broadcasts the
optimum SIC power levels

IoT- devices randomly select their
power levels and transmit

Yes
No
Distinct power levels?

Attempts < k
No

Yes

Abort and backoff for
a random period

Success

Figure 4.4 SAN protocol.
4.3.2

Multiple Hypothesis Testing
The detection of active devices starts after the IoT devices send their transmission request

to the IoT gateway as illustrated in Figure 4.3. After receiving the beacon, all the IoT devices send
at the same power level (with the same modulation level) a training sequence of length L using the
Slotted Aloha protocol. The superimposed received signal at the IoT gateway from 0 active
transmitting IoT devices is given by
1 = 23 + 4,

(4.2)

where 2 = [ℎ+ , ℎ7 , … , ℎ9 ] ∈ ℝ=×? and ℎ@ is the channel gain between the nth IoT device and the
IoT gateway. 3 ∈ ℝ9×A is the transmit sequence (e.g., BPSK) from 0 IoT active devices and 4 ∈
ℝ+×A is the additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance B 7 . The multiple
hypothesis test is used to detect the number of 0 active IoT devices from the total C IoT devices.
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The following hypotheses testing procedure is used to sequentially detect the number of
active devices:
ℋE : Received signal contains only noise
1= 4

(4.3)

ℋ+ : Received signal contains data from at least one IoT device
1 = ℎ+ 3+ + 4,

(4.4)

ℋ9 : Received signal contains data from at most N IoT devices
1 = 23 + 4.

(4.5)

We assume ℎ@ = 1, ∀ . ∈ {1, 2, … , 0}. Using the Neyman-Pearson (NP) test [69], we can
write the Likelihood Ratio (LR) testing ℋ9 vs. ℋ9L+ as
M(1;∑Q
PRS 3P ,ℋQ )

M(1;∑QUS
PRS 3P ;ℋQUS

=
)

S
Q
\
(1L∑Q
PRS [P 3P ) (1L∑PRS [P 3P )]
YZY
S
QUS
\
VWMXL Y (1L∑QUS
PRS [P 3P ) (1L∑PRS [P 3P )]
YZ

VWMXL

ℋ

Q
≷ℋQUS
_,

0 = 1, … . C,

(4.6)

where 3@ ∈ ℝ+×A is the transmitted sequence from the nth IoT device. By taking the logarithm,
(4.6) is simplified to
+
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(4.7)

The NP detector, or the test statistic, in (4.7) compares the sample mean of the received
signal to the threshold _ i to decide on a hypothesis ℋ9 or ℋ9L+ . The NP test terminates if the
number of detected devices exceeds the SIC degree (the number of receiver optimum power levels,
which is taken as 3 levels in this section). To compute the threshold _ i in (4.7) for a desired
probability of false alarm PFA, which occurs when deciding ℋ9 if the test in (4.7) is greater than
the threshold _ i , so that PFA can be written as
(jk = ((`(1) > _ i ; ℋ9 ).
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(4.8)

Since the test in (4.7) under both hypotheses is a Gaussian distribution, that
9L+
`(1) ~ n(∑AL+
a*E ∑@*+ 3@ ,

bY
A

9
) under ℋ9L+ and `(1) ~ n(∑AL+
a*E ∑@*+ 3@ ,

bY
A

) under ℋ9 we

rewrite (4.8) as
Q
e q L∑rUS
sRt ∑PRS 3P

(jk = o p

v

'b Y ⁄A

(4.9)

Thus, the threshold _ i is given by
9
_ i = oL+ ((jk )'B 7 ⁄w + ∑AL+
a*E ∑@*+ 3@ .

(4.10)

Following the same steps, the probability of detecting the number of active devices is
(x = o p

QUS
e q L∑rUS
sRt ∑PRS yP

'b Y ⁄A

v.

(4.11)

From (4.8), (4.9) we can write the (x as a function of energy to noise ratio as
(x = o poL+ ((jk ) +

rUS QUS
Q
∑rUS
sRt ∑PRS 3P L∑sRt ∑PRS 3P

'b Y ⁄A

v.

(4.12)
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Figure 4.5 The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) of the energy detector.

38

1

Figure 4.5 illustrates the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of the energy
detector. Observe that the detection performance increases monotonically and smoothly with
increasing SNR.
4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, the simulation results are presented to evaluate the performance of the SAN
and CSMA/CA protocols based on throughput and average delay. Throughout the simulation, we
assume there is one IoT gateway and a total of C IoT devices. A binomial distribution is considered
to model the random number of active IoT devices N, each with a probability of transmission {| .
(} (0; {| , C) = f~
g {| 9 (1 − {| )~L9 .
9

(4.13)

Figure 4.6 shows the throughput of SAN for different values of {| , and Ä = 3 maximum
attempts for the random selection of distinct optimum power levels (so, the probability of success
should be 0.4 within 3 attemps). The throughput is the average number of successful transmissions
for each probability of transmission over time. As expected, we observe that the throughput
decreases with increasing probability of transmission in both protocols. More importantly, we can
see that the throughput of the SAN protocol is weighted by the average payload of successful
transmissions and always higher than that of the Slotted Aloha protocol. When the probability of
transmission is 0.03, the throughput of SAN with 3 power levels performs better than the
CSMA/CA and has 5 times higher throughput than that of (conventional) Slotted Aloha. This
demonstrates that NOMA with a SIC receiver can significantly improve the throughput of Slotted
Aloha. However, the throughput of SAN becomes lower than CSMA/CA for a probability of
transmission greater than 0.06 (i.e., increase of offered load from the IoT devices), which is not
surprising since for M = 50 the average number of active devices exceeds the number of acceptable
power levels (SIC capability). The improved performance of CSMA/CA in a higher probability of
transmission regime is due to the collision avoidance mechanism. It can be noted from Figure 4.7
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that adding more power levels (6 power levels) to SAN increase the throughput at the expense of
the average delay, which is discussed next.

Figure 4.6 The throughput of SAN Ä = 3 vs. Slotted Aloha and CSMA/CA for different values
of probability of transmission M=50.
The second performance metric is the average delay as shown in Figure 4.5. In the
simulation, the average delay is composed of propagation delay, data processing delay, random
backoff delay, sensing delay (in CSMA/CA) and selecting distinct power levels attempts (in SAN).
Observe that the average delay of SAN exceeds that of CSMA/CA in the low probability of
transmission case due to the unique power level selection process, which enables the higher
throughput as mentioned above. The more attempts allowed for picking the optimum power levels,
the higher the throughput that can be achieved at the cost of increased delay. Since the backlogged
IoT devices (i.e., those that failed to transmit in the previous try) have not been considered as
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rejoining the transmission queue7, the average delay reported at a higher probability of
transmission is the propagation delay and the random backoff delay.

Figure 4.7 The average delay of SAN and CSMA/CA.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
A novel protocol (SAN) for M2M communications in IoT networks was presented and
compared to CSMA/CA protocol in terms of throughput and delay access. The synergistic
combination in SAN of Slotted Aloha,

NOMA,

and SIC reception was demonstrated to

significantly improve the throughput performance with respect to the CSMA/CA and Aloha
protocols at a low probability of transmission. Simulation results show that the SAN protocol can
outperform CSMA/CA at a higher probability of transmission by increasing the number of
received signals (that is, the power levels) at the cost of average delay.

7

The same assumption is made in Abramson’s original Aloha analyis [70].
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CHAPTER 5: DATA DRIVEN BEAM SWEEPING FOR 5G mmWAVE CELLULAR
SYSTEMS
5.1 Introduction
The vast available spectrum at mmWave frequencies between 24 GHz to 100 GHz offers
orders of magnitude greater bandwidths for cellular communication. However, the propagation
environment at the mmWave bands are poor (high pathloss and blocking) compared to the
frequency bands used by previous cellular system generations. To cope with the harsh propagation
conditions, the user equipment (UE) and gNB8 must establish a highly directional transmission
link using beamforming. However, the directional transmission links required fine beam alignment
between the transmitter and receiver. It is worth mentioning that significant Non- line-of-sight
(NLOS) street-level coverage is possible up to approximately 200 m from a base station based on
the measurements in New York City at 28 and 73 GHz [71].
In this chapter9, beam sweeping pattern prediction to determine the beam hopping sequence
during cell search that is based on the dynamic distribution of user traffic is investigated. This is
done by using a form of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) called a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU).
5.2 Beam Sweeping in mmWave Cellular Systems
The standalone 5G mmWave system is subject to significant coverage issues if
beam sweeping (directional transmission) is not applied during cell search. In the current 4G LTE

8

gNB is the 5G New Radio term for a base station.
The content of this chapter has been published in [13]- [14] and it is included in this dissertation with permission
from the IEEE. Permission is included in Appendix A.
9
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system, the initial access is performed on omnidirectional channels, whereas the beamforming
transmission is performed after establishing the physical link [69]. On another hand, to cope with
the converge issue resulting from the increased isotropic path loss in mmWave frequencies, in 5G
standalone mmWave cellular systems, the initial access must be performed on directional-limited
channels [72].
In the ongoing 5G NR standalone mmWave standards meetings, the so-called
synchronization signal block (SSB) was introduced, which comprises a primary synchronization
signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel
(PBCH)[72]. The synchronization signal burst was allocated 250 microseconds, which was further
divided into 14 SSB as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The gNB may sweep 14 different directions (per
antenna port) for the sync transmission. The exact choice of the sweeping pattern can be left to the
cells; this pattern should occur periodically and the maximum periodicity must be known by the
UE [73].

Figure 5.1 Resources allocated to sync transmission in 5G NR.
The initial access in 5G New Radio (NR) standalone millimeter-wave systems is a timeconsuming search to determine suitable directions of transmission and reception. The overall
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procedures of cell acquisition in standalone mmWave systems is composed of four operations
under the term beam management as depicted in Figure 5.2 [74].


Beam sweeping. Transmitting the synchronization signals to cover a spatial area using a
set of predetermined directions (beamforming vector) and time interval.



Beam measurement. Evaluating the quality of the received at the gNB or at UE.



Beam determination. The UE selects the beam (optimal directional communication link)
that provides the maximum SNR and above a predefine threshold according to the beam
measurement.



Beam reporting. After beam determination, the UE wait for the gNB to schedule directional
(Random Access Channel) RACH resource to send its RACH preamble.

Figure 5.2 Beam management procedures in standalone mmWave cellular system.
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The problem of interest in this research is the cell discovery. In the cell discovery phase,
one approach is sequential beam sweeping by the base station that requires a brute force search
through many beam-pair combinations between the UE and the gNB to find the optimum beampair (i.e. the one with the highest RSRP10-level) as shown in Figure 5.3. The sequential search may
result in a large access delay and low initial access efficiency. It is worth mentioning that a UE
does not only need to carry out cell search at power-up, but to support mobility. It also needs to
continuously search for and synchronize to neighboring cells and estimate their reception quality.
The reception quality of the neighboring cells, in relation to the reception quality of the current
cell, is then evaluated to determine if a handover (for devices in RRC CONNECTED) or cell
reselection (for devices in RRC IDLE) should be carried out [75].

Figure 5.3 Beam sweeping during initial access.
5.3 Recurrent Neural Network Beam Sweeping
To ensure that users can be quickly accessed, a form of machine learning can be used to
optimize the sweeping pattern of the gNB, including beam direction and sweeping pattern

10

RSRP: Reference signal received power
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according to the predicted user’s spatial distribution from users’ historical data (e.g. delay access,
access success rate and beam direction etc.). The focus of this research is the sweeping pattern
(hopping) in the cell discovery phase. The proposed approach leverages intelligence from the call
detail record CDR data collected from the Milan City network, provided by Telcom Italia as part
of their Big Data challenge [76].
5.3.1

Dataset
The data used in this dissertation is in form of CDRs of Internet activity, calling and text

messages as given in Table 5.1. The dataset measures the level of interaction of the users and the
cellular network by temporally aggregating CDRs in timeslots of 10 minutes. The datasets provide
spatial information about each CDR by using the Milano Grid [77] CDR data, which contains
numbered squares (square ID) that are overlaid over Milan city as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4 Milano Grid
The data takes the coordinates of each CDR and only provides the square ID. Therefore, to
achieve the objective of the proposed data-driven sweeping pattern, we assume that a cell is made
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of four squares in the Milano grid and each square represents a sector (direction). In order to
determine the users’ activity in each sector, the raw data in Table 5.1 is preprocessed by counting
the number of CDRs (non-zero activity in Table 5.1 in each square ID) that was recorded in the
same timestamp in a given sector. The resulting sample data points are presented in in Table 5.2,
which show the number of CDRs on ”2013-11- 03” at five timestamps in four sectors denoted by
A, B, C and D (Square ID 1,2,101,102 in Table 5.1). In this research the pseudo-omni beam (i.e.,
widest beam width) transmission is adapted (i.e., the gNB transmits the synchronization signal for
a longer duration with a pseudo-omni beams). The order of the beam sweeping is determined based
on time series prediction using a Neural Network as discussed later.
Table 5.1 Samples from Milan dataset
Square
ID

Time

SMS-inactivity

SMS-outactivity

Call-inactivity

Call-outactivity

Internettraffic

1

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.108039

0

0

0

0

1

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.109257

0

0

0

0

1

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.027356

0.029144

0.027356

0.055578

9.282384

2

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.088022

0

0

0

0

101

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.042141

0.55355

0.026832

0.052954

8.114206

101

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.027706

0.027244

0.027706

0.055225

9.246850

102

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.109438

0

0

0

0

102

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.026137

0.030875

0.026137

0.055225

9.260190

102

2013-11-03 23:00:00

0.19

0.109900

0.027244

0

9.228577

1

2013-11-03 23:10:00

0

0

0.028502

0.05789

8.235573

1

2013-11-03 23:10:00

0.042141

0

0

0.055233

8.134563
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Table 5.2 Number of CDRs per sector after preprocessing

5.3.2

Time

A

B

C

D

2013-11-03 23:00:00

7

1

10

10

2013-11-03 23:10:00

6

4

7

9

2013-11-03 23:20:00

8

2

9

6

2013-11-03 23:30:00

11

5

12

11

2013-11-03 23:40:00

5

7

8

13

Recurrent Neural Networks
The number of CDRs in each sector in Table 5.2 is a time series. To determine the sweeping

pattern, a recurrent neural network (RNN) is used to predict the number of CDRs in all sectors,
which is used to prioritize the sweeping hopping pattern. The RNN architecture can capture
dependencies at different time scales. This is achieved by passing some information from the
previous time step to contribute to the output at the present time step, that addition of memory
allows the time dependencies in the data to affect the prediction. Figure 5.5 illustrates a “rolled”
and “unrolled” RNN diagrams in time with a layer of neurons A. Observe that the output at time
ht, depends on the current input Xt and the previous state (t-1) of layer A as shown in the unrolled
version of the RNN in Figure 5.5.
ht

A

X

t

ht -1

C
t-2

A

ht

C
t-1

Xt -1

C

A

Xt

Rolled

Unrolled

Figure 5.5 Rolled RNN (left) and its unrolled version (right)
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ht +1

t

A

X
t+1

C
t+1

The traditional RNNs are very hard to train using backpropagation because of the gradient
vanishing, i.e. the derivatives of the activation functions used in the neural network approach zero
quickly, which means the typical RNN can only capture a short temporal pattern in the data
sequence. Spatial gates were introduced to solve the gradient vanishing problem such as Gated
Recurrent Unit (GRU)[78].
5.3.3

Gated Recurrent Unit Architecture
The GRU neural net was first introduced by Cho et al. [78] for a statistical machine

translation task. Figure 5.6 illustrates the architecture of a GRU cell. A GRU made of two gates.
The first is the update gate, which controls how much of the current cell content should be updated
with the new candidate state. The second is the reset gate, which resets the memory of the cell if
it is closed i.e. the unit acts as if the next processed input was the first in the sequence. The
following steps explained the operations of the state equations of the GRU [79].


First, the updated gate u[t] is calculated using
1

,

where x[t] is the input data sequence (number of CDRs in all sectors),
from the previous time step,



1 is the state

is the weight matrix for the input at the update gate,

the weight matrix for the previous state and
function

(5.1)

is

is the bias vector. A sigmoid activation

is applied to scale the results between 0 and 1.

The reset gate is used to decide how much of the past information in the previous states to
forget and can be obtain by
1

,

(5.2)

Note that the rest gate is similar to the update gate with a difference in the weight matrices,
the bias plus the functionality of the gate, which is given by
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1⨀

,

(5.3)

where the element-wise product ⨀ (Hadamard product) between

1 and

determines what to remove from the previous time steps.


Next, the candidate state is calculated by
1
where



,

(5.4)

1 the information from the previous state after applying the rest gate in (5.3).

Finally, the information for the current state is calculated by
1

⨀

1

⨀

,

(5.5)

In this chapter, a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) Neural Network with 512 units is used to
predict the number of CDRs in all sectors.

ht

×

h t -1
×

+

ht

1−
×

ht
σr

σu

zt
g

xt

Figure 5.6 A recurrent unit in the GRU architecture. Dark gray circles with a solid line are the
variables whose content is exchanged with the input and output of the network. Dark gray circles
with a dashed line represent the internal state variables, whose content is exchanged within the
cells of the hidden layer. White circles with +, 1 and represent linear operations.
5.4 Comparing the RNN Beam Sweeping with Random Starting Point Beam Sweeping
In this section, the delay analysis of two approaches is compared to quantify how much
faster the data-driven approach is than the random starting point scheme. In both schemes, we
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assume that the gNB sweeps through L possible directions. We will call each such cycle of L
transmissions a “scanning cycle.” Since the transmission period is T seconds, each scan cycle will
take LT seconds as depicted in Figure 5.7.

L Transmission
directions

Figure 5.7 The scanning cycle in the initial access.
The synchronization delay is the time it takes the UE to detect the presence of the
synchronization signal in the initial access phase. Assuming the ideal case where UE can reliably
detect and decode the synchronization signal in the first scanning cycle, the synchronization delay
of the data-driven approach and the random starting point scheme is compared in two different
scenarios: (1) UEs are uniformly distributed over the angular space (transmission directions) as
illustrated in Figure 5.8 (a) and (2) UE are sparsely distributed over the angular space (transmission
directions) as illustrated in Figure 5.8 (b)
5.4.1

Uniformly Distributed UE
In this case, the UE are distributed over the transmission directions uniformly, i.e. there are

UE in all sectors as in Figure 5.8 (a). Intuitively, both schemes have similar synchronization delays
in terms of accessed UE per scanning cycle as will be demonstrated next.
5.4.2

Sparsely Distributed UE
In this scenario, the data-driven approach using a RNN outperforms the random starting

point scheme in terms of the number of accessed UE per scanning cycle during the initial access
phase. This can be demonstrated by the following scenario:
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suppose that there are eight sectors (transmission directions) with 16 UE distributed as shown in
Figure 5.9 and analog beamforming is used to scan the angular space during the initial access
phase. In the random starting point, the gNB starts the sweeping by randomly picking one direction
out of eight possible directions. Then, it could either continue with the remaining directions using
the sequential sweeping clockwise/anti-clockwise from the randomly selected starting points or
pick randomly from the remaining directions until all directions are swept. Note that, in the random
starting point scheme the gNB must scan all the directions i.e. complete one scanning cycle to
access all 16 UE. On the other hand, in the initial access using a RNN the gNB need only scan the
populated directions relaying on the accurate prediction from the RNN. Thus, the initial access
based on the RNN may access 16 UE in a fraction of the scanning cycle (in Figure 5.9 16 a UE
can initially access the gNB in half a scanning cycle).

(a)

(b)
Figure 5.8 (a) UE are uniformly distributed over the transmission directions. (b) UE have a sparse
distribution over the transmission directions.
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Figure 5.9 The UE are sparsely distributed over eight transmission directions.
5.5 Simulation Results
In our study, two weeks of Milan CDR data (Nov 04, 2013 to Nov 17, 2013) were used to
predict the user distribution in four sectors between the instants when the CDRs are measured. A
total of 1684 sequences was used to train the GRU model and 188 to test it. The model was trained
with 20 epochs, each with 50 steps. The model takes 28min 55s to train with the above-mentioned
epochs and needs to be re-trained offline once every several days. Figure 5.10 depicts the
prediction performance of the GRU model on the tested sequences, which is the aggregated CDR
per direction as a function of time (every 10 minutes). It can be seen that the prediction is very
close to the ground truth11 most of the time. Based on the prediction the pseudo-omni beam can be
directed toward the sector with a maximum number of CDRs. In the case that the number of CDRs
are equal, the gNB chooses the sweeping order randomly. The GRU is optimized by minimizing
the Mean Square Error (MSE) as a cost function. Figure 5.11 depicts the gradual decrease of the
cost function with the epoch number, which results in the rapid learning rate of the model.

11

In machine learning, the term "ground truth" refers to the accuracy of the training set's classification for supervised
learning techniques.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.10 CDRs prediction and ground truth (the actual distribution) for four sectors (a) sector
A, (b) sector B, (c) sector C and (d) sector D.
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Figure 5.11 Convergence of GRU training model calculated based on MSE cost function
The performance of RNN beam sweeping and random starting point in different UE
distribution is illustrated in Figure 5.12. Note that both schemes require one scanning cycle in the
uniformly distributed UE scenario, however, the RNN beam sweeping outperforms the random
starting point scheme in the sparsely distributed UE as it requires approximately 0.2 scanning cycle
on average. Figure 5.13. shows the cumulative distribution function of the scanning cycle when
the RNN beam sweeping is applied on eight sectors (transmission directions). The UE distribution
over the angular space is derived from the call details record (CDR) of Milan City [2]. Note that
the UE can initially assess the gNB in approximately 0.41 of a complete scanning cycle with
probability 0.9. As mentioned in section 5.4.1, the random starting point beam sweeping covers
the angular space by performing a complete scanning cycle. Thus, the RNN beam sweeping
scheme converge faster than the random starting point approach.
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Figure 5.12 Average scanning cycle in different UE distribution.

Figure 5.13 The CDF of the scanning cycle of RNN based beam sweeping.
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5.6 Concluding Remarks
Data-driven beam sweeping (hopping) patterns have been introduced in this chapter for 5G
mmWave cellular system initial access. It is shown that as GRU neural network can predict the
CDRs with high accuracy, which is then used to adjust the sweeping pattern in the angular domain.
Although, the pseudo-omni approach was considered due to the lack of exact user location in the
gNB coverage, sweeping with a narrow beam can be done if the data reveals more information
about the locations. The data-driven beam sweeping was demonstrated to significantly reduce the
scanning cycle during the initial access with respect to a random starting point in a sparsely
distributed UE scenario.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
6.1 Main Contributions and Conclusions
This dissertation is directed toward investigating, evaluating, and enhancing security,
throughput, and latency in a variety of 5G infrastructure networks.
In Chapter 3, a novel physical layer secure key management for symmetric cryptography
was presented. The unique wireless channel characteristic between the legitimate users and an
eavesdropper is exploited to create a low probability of interception and a large frame error
probability (FEP) at the unintended receiver, while the intended receiver successfully receives the
transmitted signal with a very low FEP. This technique becomes more attractive at mmWave
frequencies because the correlation between the main channel and the wiretap channel is
dramatically reduced, which implies a low probability of key interception by the eavesdropper.
In Chapter 4, a novel Hybrid MAC protocol (SAN) for M2M communications in IoT
networks was presented. The SAN is easy to implement, compatible with low power/complexity
of IoT devices and significantly improves the throughput compared to Slotted Aloha and
CSMA/CA in a sporadic traffic pattern where IoT devices have a low probability of transmission.
The superior throughput of the SAN protocol is a result of using NOMA with a SIC receiver and
a novel random modulation algorithm that enables the IoT devices to select distinct power levels
during the transmission period of the SAN protocol.
In Chapter 5, RNN neural net based beam sweeping for 5G mmWave cellular systems was
proposed. The Call Detail Records (CDRs) of Milan city were leveraged to accelerate the initial
acquisition procedure in mmWave 5G new radio by using machine learning (ML) to prioritize the

58

beam sweeping pattern during the initial access. The ML data-driven based beam sweeping
outperforms the random starting point beam sweeping in terms of the required scanning cycle to
send the synchronization signals in sparsely distributed UE scenario.
6.2 Future Directions
This section presents some promising directions for future work related to the contributions
in this dissertation.
•

Implementing the proposed secure key management via physical layer security processing
in a real experimental testbed using a Software Defined Radio (SDR) platforms such as the
Ettus Research Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP). This would demonstrate
corroborating results on the correlation between the main and wiretap channels for different
spatial and temporal scenarios and verify the theoretical and simulation results presented
in Chapter 3. Furthermore, extensions of the proposed algorithm to multiple legitimate
users and multiple eavesdroppers are of interest especially at mmWave frequencies where
a massive number of antennas at the base station can serve multiple legitimate users
leveraging the spatial correlation.

•

Extending the evaluating the throughput of the SAN protocol using an imperfect SIC
receiver is an interesting research direction. Similarly investigating the fairness of SAN
protocols and the effect on performance of the backlogged IoT devices that rejoin the
transmission queue. Moreover, extend the multiple hypothesis testing procedure for the
Rayleigh channel to investigate the further extension of the use cases of the SAN protocol
beyond the Smart Home use case.

•

Extending and quantifying the access delay of the data-driven sweeping order using a GRU
neural net and a comparison with a random starting point sweeping for the detection of the
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synchronization signals using different mmWave channel models is an important research
topic. As is, evaluating RNN based beam sweeping when narrow beams are used to
transmit the synchronization signals.
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